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Facing each other across the Indian Ocean are two parallel histories of race, 
culture, and phantasy.1 In the era of state racism that spanned the long 
middle of the twentieth century, South Africa and Australia produced two 
contrasting responses to miscegenation. In South Africa the ideologues of 
apartheid professed to ward off the spectre of mixing White and Black, 
European and African, through separation. In Australia, where, against 
the background of strict racial separation and laws against interracial sex, a 
certain strand of eugenicist thinking and policy recognised the history and 
inevitability of continued mixing between Whites and Aborigines, a policy 
of selective assimilation was pursued. When assimilation turned for a time 
into “absorption”,2 until World War Two put paid to overt eugenics, it is 
safe to say that miscegenation was actively sanctioned and promoted by the 
authorities. 
The contrast I am drawing is broad and open to qualification.3 Historiography 
of apartheid has attended less than it might have to assimilationist ideas, 
some of which, despite their limited political influence during the apartheid 
era, have re-emerged in different guises in recent South African literature 
and cultural criticism. At the same time, it may be that Australian racial 
assimilation and “absorption” would not have drawn the public emphasis 
they have, if the relatively obscure archive relating to these policies had not 
been repeatedly brought to light in activism, official discourse, memoir, 
fiction and film, by representations of the forced removal from their families 
and communities of the thousands of Aboriginal children known as the 
“stolen generations”.
1
My first encounter with the imaginative representation of the stolen 
generations was, as may be the case for many outside Australia, Philip 
Noyce’s film Rabbit-Proof Fence (2002), the story of three girls who escaped 
from the Moore River Aboriginal Settlement in 1930 and journeyed 1600 
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kilometres on foot back to their home in the north of Western Australia by 
following one of the state’s rabbit-proof fences. Already familiar with the 
history of forced removal, fostering out, and adoption from conversations 
with Australian legal scholars, I had read sections of Bringing Them Home: 
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children from Their Families (1997), which gave official imprimatur 
to the history and included the testimony of many of the removed.4 But as 
the first work of the narrative imagination I encountered on removal, Noyce’s 
film impressed a cognitive surface not yet informed by the series of memoirs 
and other works, or by the wealth of historical and critical material, that had 
appeared on the subject in the two decades before Rabbit-Proof Fence.5 
Noyce’s film continues to orient my analysis of writing and film on the “stolen 
generations”. As I understand it, this is because melodrama, like the other 
popular narrative genres with which it combines in the film, will parade on 
its surface phantasies that, elsewhere, tend to be less overtly displayed—for 
example, in official discourse, political debates, protest literature, and even 
in serious narrative fiction. Although I think it is a necessary first step, as 
will become clear, I do not think that diagnosing a given act of government 
or of meaning-making as phantasy is the end point of critical analysis. My 
guiding question has instead become: how much explanatory authority does 
one grant the interpretation of a given policy or narrative morphology as the 
setting to work of phantasy?
A comparison of Noyce’s film with the book on which it was based 
demonstrates how genre film draws phantasy to the surface. Whereas Doris 
Pilkington’s Follow the Rabbit-Proof Fence (1996) is quite emphatic about how 
the policy of removal in 1930s Western Australia was based on the selective 
assimilation of lighter-skinned Aboriginal children of white paternity (a use 
of racial markers to dictate selective cultural investment through schooling 
and training in certain spheres of labour),6 and shows how the state saw itself 
as acting in place of delinquent white fathers,7 it stops short of analysing the 
ideological inconsistencies, contradictions and painful broken promises of 
the policy as pathological. It reveals, as do other texts, how the promise of 
education, a key alibi for removal from their mothers and from Aboriginal 
communities, became a false one when girls were taken out of school and 
pressed into domestic service in white households (Pilkington 59–60). 
Where limited assimilation is advocated, race is displaced by culture, and 
cultural similarity or affinity displaces racial difference. But the displacement, 
as displacements are, is incomplete. The removed child continues to find 
herself on the wrong side of the racial division that, supposedly overcome 
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through cultural assimilation, informed her removal in the first place.8 As 
the penny-pinching evident in official correspondence quoted by Pilkington 
suggests, the policy of assimilation was pursued only as far as the limited 
resources of the administration could permit (Pilkington 128–129).9 Removal 
would thus inevitably have constituted a limited form of welfare; the wards of 
the state would sooner or later have had to earn their keep. They would thus, 
in a kind of primitive accumulation through abduction, have become part 
of the colonial labour pool. Does that mean that one can fully explain the 
system of removal, as some scholars have persuasively attempted, in terms of 
economic motives dressed up in the ideological language of paternalism?
Noyce’s film adaptation adds another dimension to the materialist critique 
of the contradictions of selective assimilation and eugenicist “absorption”—
which Pilkington does not emphasise—by bringing to centre stage A. O. 
Neville (1875–1954), Chief Protector of Aborigines in Western Australia.10 
A relatively though not completely marginal figure in Pilkington’s book,11 
Neville, who is played by Kenneth Branagh, is magnified as a figure of 
diabolical paternalism in the film. Opposite the sisters Molly and Daisy 
Craig and their cousin Gracie Fields trekking against the odds across the 
vast Australian landscape, he is the malign, scheming antagonist required 
by melodrama. If in Pilkington’s book actual white fathers can be portrayed 
as relatively benign and well-meaning, albeit ineffectual against the state’s 
removal of their children (48–49), in Noyce’s film white Australian paternalism 
is represented by the hyperbolic Father of phantasy. This portrayal of Neville 
is not altogether surprising. On the one hand, Neville, who presided over 
his department almost single-handedly for twenty-five years, and as Chief 
Protector eventually became legal guardian of all Aboriginal children in 
Western Australia (Haebich, For Their Own Good 278), personifies for 
Indigenous writers such as Doris Pilkington, Jack Davis, Stephen Kinnane, 
and Kim Scott a detested system of interference and control. Questions 
about the system are always already questions about Neville, his motives and 
psychopathology. On the other hand, Neville’s own discourse, particularly 
in the major statement of his thought, Australia’s Coloured Minority: Its Place 
in the Community (1947), is so lofty and unquestioning in its assumption of 
a racial-historical mission that, as in the case of Geoffrey Cronjé’s apartheid 
writings in South Africa,12 one automatically suspects the operation of less 
easily acknowledged wishes. Through the magnification of the father into 
the Father, the drama of the broken family becomes national allegory.
When the political dimension of the story is amplified in this way, we see 
how phantasy operates as much in official discourse as in Noyce’s film. In 
MISCEGENATIONS 13
Bringing Them Home we read of a historical rivalry between state-sponsored 
race engineering and Indigenous family life. At another level, in Bringing 
Them Home, where detailed measures for material and symbolic reparations 
are tabled (Bringing 249–313), we also bear witness to a history in which the 
mother (“Mum”) to be repaired is the central figure. “Why was my Mum 
meant to suffer?” asks one deponent (Bringing 277). When the testimony 
in Bringing Them Home is supplemented by the melodrama of Rabbit-Proof 
Fence, however, a pathological phantasy of colonial fathering emerges as 
uncanny counterpart to this reparation of the mother. 
The psychoanalytic ideas of Melanie Klein allow us to reflect further 
on Branagh’s performance of A. O. Neville as wifeless Devil-Father.13 
Elaborating her concept of reparation in the 1930s, Klein wrote about how 
the infant attempts to make good symbolically (for) the damage that it 
has done in phantasy to the mother’s breast (“Love, Guilt and Reparation” 
307–308). This dynamic, which is repeated throughout life in different 
situations, may be regarded as the basis for the emergence of a subject of 
ethics or responsibility.14 In these later situations damage may be actual, 
even if, for Klein, the subject’s response to inflicting damage derives its 
conditions of possibility from infantile phantasies of damage that does not 
need to have been actual. Applying her idea of reparation to history, Klein 
writes about the repopulation through settler-colonial societies that follows 
“ruthless cruelty against native populations” (“Love, Guilt and Reparation” 
334). In terms of Klein’s subsequent elaboration of her theory, the infant’s 
reparation, which she terms “depressive”, may become “manic” when, beset 
by persecutory paranoid phantasies, it continues, despite a profession of the 
omnipotence of its wishes to make the object good, to inflict damage on 
it, or to punish it. The “manic” making-good by the infant and the adult 
it becomes thereby turns into a doing of harm, which may, of course, be a 
repetition of harm already done.15
The forced-removal policy may be interpreted as a peculiar historical variant 
of this dynamic. In Australia’s Coloured Minority, Neville tells a story of 
violent colonial beginnings, and of a corresponding moral imperative. 
“The causes of their condition are many”, Neville writes, “[m]ainly it is 
not their fault, it is ours, just as it lies with us to put the matter right” 
(21). It is up to white Australians to “do the right thing” (22). For Neville, 
Aborigines are “the real owners of the land [. . .] We are all newcomers to 
them, dispossessors, despoilers” (23). Neville makes no bones about where 
he thinks historical responsibility lies: “Miscegenation which produced the 
grandparents and parents of the existing coloured people of Australia has 
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been going on for over a hundred years, and this compels us to-day to seek 
means of adjusting some of its distressing results. Our men appropriated full-
blood women from the earliest days of settlement” (43). Continuing in an at 
times colloquial register, Neville observes that “if white men had been made 
responsible for their coloured offspring from the earliest days, we should 
have a different story to tell and have been saved much costly effort” (51). 
Hence, “The State then becomes the only guardian these poor kids know, 
because few white fathers of the type mentioned can be made to accept their 
responsibilities” (53).
This assumption of guardianship is allied, I would suggest, with the phantasy 
of repopulation described by Klein. In the name of making good and of 
accepting responsibility as the better father, then, the State-Father claims 
“half-caste” or “coloured” children as white—and therefore his. Or, perhaps 
more perverse, it conducts a manic reparation—after the effective colonial 
genocide, in the name of doing-good by her—of the mother through the 
stealing, abuse, exploitation and humiliation of her children. Perceived 
another way, the forced removal of children is their manic reparation: the 
father (re)gains the children that he never acknowledged. He makes them 
good, makes them whole, as his children, yet they are continually punished: 
the institutions, the foster and adoption systems, will always fall short of the 
good mother—of “Mum”. It will, in many respects, be exploitative. And 
because it aims to separate children from their cultural heritage, its methods 
of acculturation—or “deculturation” (Frow 358)—will, for commentators 
dating back at least to the 1960s,16 and including the authors of Bringing 
Them Home (270–275), have amounted to genocide. And because Neville’s 
advocated policy in its late form, articulated in his text and photographs of 
successive generations (58–63), travels from cultural assimilation toward 
racial “absorption”, emphasising the progressive becoming-white of the 
“coloured minority”, and the rarity of “atavism” to the black, it will have 
threatened to repeat in more ways than one an earlier, less openly 
acknowledged, genocide.17
Such a reading complicates “intention” whenever clear, unambiguous 
intent—What were their reasons? What were their motives?—is seen as 
necessary for making a political case (see Bringing 277). It also identifies a 
deeper current beneath what Noel Pearson refers to as the “moral vanity” 
of the Australian left (“White Guilt” 30–31). An attention to the dynamics 
of paternalist manic reparation are, I hold, a necessary complement, in 
history-writing and cultural critique, to the massive filial reparation of 
“Mum” in so many of the testimonies of those removed. If, as Klein writes, 
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the reparative dynamics of infancy are repeated in later life, it would follow 
that, in acts of the State-Father, we may also observe the agency of the son. 
When reparative initiatives are, for agents as well as their critics, a mute 
but active infantile remnant in the State-Father, then there may exist an 
unexamined complicity of the depressive symbolic reparation of “Mum” 
by the deponents of Bringing Them Home and their advocates, and her 
manic reparation by the state through its laws and policies. Each subject of 
reparation professes a wish to do good, and to do the right thing, by “Mum”. 
The meaning of the respective wishes, although quite different in context, is 
in terms of underlying dynamics so close as to make them at times well-nigh 
indistinguishable.
In an illuminating essay on the “White Father”, Fiona Probyn powerfully 
draws our attention to the dynamics of paternalist manic reparation latent 
in recent Australian politics of reconciliation. Analysing John Howard’s 1999 
“Motion for Reconciliation” speech, Probyn argues that
[his] paternalistic position in regards to “fellow Australians who are 
indigenous” is predicated on the exclusion of the “real” white fathers 
from his “good” white community; they are repressed/dissociated in 
order that they may return in the form of the “good” white paternal 
figure of his imaginary “Australian community” [. . .] [Historically,] 
[t]he “bad white father” trope [. . .] introduced the “good white father” 
government into the lives of all Aboriginal people”. (Probyn 61, 70)
The continuities of Howard’s paternalism with that of A. O. Neville, which 
splits off from state benevolence “white fathers of the type mentioned” (53), 
are clear.18 Probyn refers in passing to Kim Scott’s novel, Benang: From the 
Heart (1999). It is a “story of men” (398). In Scott’s novel, set in the southwest 
of Western Australia, Neville is a central figure. As in Rabbit-Proof Fence, he 
is a sinister puppet-master dictating the destinies of Aboriginal children and 
adults from his office in Perth. He is, as in Noyce’s film, the “devil Neville” 
(122-123). But the central antagonist is the narrator’s grandfather, Ernest 
Solomon Scat, a country building contractor who, when he first came from 
Scotland, worked in the office of Neville, who was his distant relative. Ern 
Scat’s project, which parallels Neville’s social engineering on a small scale, 
is to produce, through breeding and husbandry, the first white man (25-
28). In a nod toward magical realism, Harley, the narrator, literalises and 
parodies Scat’s project of racial “upliftment” by his tendency to levitate and 
float in the air. When Harley discovers his grandfather’s archive, he sets out 
to make his project fail by refusing to be white. He writes the history of his 
family, as far as it can be reconstructed from and imagined beyond Scat’s 
genealogies, photographs, and other sources. In this history of racial mixing, 
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rape, massacre, police surveillance, removal, and fostering out, he discovers 
no white (great grand-)father at the beginning, and will not be the white 
son at the end: “Sandy One was no white man. Just as I am no white man” 
(492, 494). This discovery and negation are, for Harley, a kind of survival 
of genocide (446; see also 449). In this “story of men”—this story of fathers 
rather than mothers—the politics of social engineering are represented as 
obscene. As a boy Harley is raped by his grandfather, as his own father had 
been raped by a man who took him out for the day from Sister Kate’s foster 
home (386–387). Visiting family, Harley learns of Ern Scat’s dubious sexual 
reputation among Aborigines (435). In an aside, Harley remembers that, 
during the time when he lived with his father and his uncle as a boy: “[Uncle 
Jack] helped arrange that my mother take in very young children for a while, 
when their own mothers got into some difficulty or other. Sometimes, these 
children were related to my father through Ern’s persistent efforts to breed 
us out, fill us with shame; all that rationalising to disguise his own desires” 
(416). Politics and history are driven by the desire of the (grand)father.19 
The burden of shame falls on the ones who bear traces of their Indigenous 
ancestry. The desire of the white father is unquestioned and unchallenged 
as, in a phantasmatic frenzy of manic reparation, it threatens to repeat the 
earlier murderous genocide through racial absorption and cultural and social 
assimilation. In the figure of Ernest Solomon Scat, doing-good through 
making-white is exposed as the acting out of a violent and exploitative sexual 
phantasy. 
It is with this manner of realisation in mind that Jennifer Rutherford writes 
in The Gauche Intruder: Freud, Lacan and the White Australian Fantasy of the 
dangers of identifying with the agency of good-making:
This identification with the power to do good underpins the 
numerous attempts at social engineering that have characterised 
Australia’s shady history of black/white relations: relations that have 
deprived Aboriginal Australians, at every turn, of their good. The 
intent to do good is the alibi that is called upon whenever this history 
of deprivation momentarily registers in the national conscience. (27; 
see also 80–81)
As Rutherford elegantly shows by analysing a childhood memory of her own, 
“[the] discourse of the unconscious interrupted the fantasy of a good that 
could speak its truth, unframed by collective fantasy [. . .] national fantasies 
are inscribed in the memory of the child, who, unable to make sense of 
a trauma, fabulates; but fabulates according to a logic that is collectively 
driven” (22). This fabulating may extend also to the work of the progressive 
feminist cultural critic when she figures women and Indigenous people as 
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victims (Rutherford 22, 70–71). Rutherford accordingly relinquishes both 
the autobiographical gesture and the project of writing the history of the 
other (81). For those who do not—for some because the history of the 
“other” is also the history of the “self ” (in a history of mixing, where is the 
line to be drawn?)—the question becomes how to inscribe the limits or 
borders, or what Derrida called the “scene of writing”,20 even as one writes 
the history. For even identifying phantasy at the nub of history may be to 
enact a manic-reparative phantasy of making- and doing-good. It may itself, 
in other words, secretly satisfy its own desire for mastery.
2
Although in Australian texts relating to the stolen generations, a relentless 
emphasis falls on the mother as the figure for the reparative and manic 
reparative efforts of the “child” (lest we restrict it to the children themselves 
in the narrow sense, let us remember that the law-giving Father-State is also 
always already the reparative or manic-reparative son), and the mother thus 
figures as the recipient of measures of making-good ranging from the nostalgic 
to the sadistic, the mother remains in shadow. If writers from A. O. Neville 
to Sally Morgan are confident in their ability to be able to assign a “place” 
to the other or self in a community, Benang struggles, as do the deponents 
in Bringing Them Home, to approach the place of the mother’s desire. In this 
history of mixing, the desire of the Indigenous mother can be a blank.21 And, 
correspondingly, when the “white mother” appears as a subject of desire, it 
is only occasionally—as, for example, an outraged Mrs. Chellow in a letter 
reproduced by Pilkington, who reports to Chief Protector Neville that Molly 
Craig and Gracie Fields “are running wild with the whites” (41). 
This mother predates the empathetic white maternal listener said by Probyn 
to characterise the reconciliation era of the 1990s (61–62). Ann Curthoys 
notes that white women in a Western Australian country town in the 
1920s, who were particularly hostile in their racism, explained their feelings 
to Nugget Coombs by asking him the rhetorical question: “If you were 
a woman and you went down the street on shopping night and you saw 
children whom you knew were your husband’s children, how would you 
feel?” (Curthoys 18–19). What is the feeling in question? Is it a jealousy of 
sexual rivalry? If it is, the dynamic has also been explored or simply taken 
for granted in colonial- and apartheid-era fiction in South Africa by, inter 
alia, Olive Schreiner in From Man to Man (1926) and Daphne Rooke in 
Mittee (1951). On reflection, however, one cannot help suspecting that 
the rhetorical question asked of Coombs conceals as much as it reveals. 
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Coombs is asked to identify—“[i]f you were a woman”—but in that act of 
identifying, if it leads him and the audience for his anecdote to the idea of 
rivalrous jealousy, perhaps there is a cancelling of desire, or, alternately, a 
mimetic identification by the woman with the (desire of the) man.22 
Is there a way out of this circle of desire? I do not know. There are, however, 
works that, in the context of ideas of assimilation and phantasies associated 
with those ideas, endeavour to explore the desire of the woman, and the 
desire of the mother, in other ways. Or at least they endeavour to put 
that other desire, or an other desire for the woman, on stage. In doing 
so, they inevitably confront the complicitous dynamics of reparation and 
manic reparation. For, if the Father is also the son, the Mother is also the 
daughter—of her father, but also of her mother.
The most comprehensive staging of assimilationist phantasy in recent 
South African writing is Marlene van Niekerk’s darkly comic novel, Agaat 
(2004). An extended fable on the violence of adoption, assimilation and 
acculturation, the novel, Van Niekerk’s second,23 is the story of two women 
on the farm Grootmoedersdrift, in the Overberg in the Southern Cape. The 
farm belongs to Milla, who is on her deathbed, three years into a slow and 
isolated death from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s 
disease—a neurodegenerative condition that destroys the ability to control 
movement and to speak, but leaves the mind intact. She is nursed by Agaat, 
who was adopted by Milla in childhood and brought up by her, only to be 
moved out of the farmhouse seven years later and made her servant. Because 
Agaat was the daughter of Coloured farm workers, her adoption did not 
enjoy the support of Milla’s husband Jak, and drew the disapproval of the 
white Afrikaans community. And, having been childless through nearly 
twelve years of miserable marriage, Milla was at last expecting a child. In a 
kind of reckoning,24 Agaat reads or recites aloud to her as she is dying from 
the diaries in which Milla recorded these and other events. 
The novel is made up of the entries from Milla’s journals—most of its 
chapters follow episodes from her deathbed in the first-person narrated by 
Milla, an account to herself by Milla of past events in the second-person, and 
telegraphic italicised fragments, apparently also by Milla, dating from the time 
when she initially began to succumb to the disease. The novel is framed at 
beginning and end by the return of Jakkie, Milla’s son, to attend his mother’s 
funeral, and by his subsequent departure. After a brief career as an airforce 
pilot, in which he was decorated for combat in Angola, Jakkie abruptly 
deserted and left South Africa for Canada, where, abandoning his training 
as an aeronautical engineer, he studied to become an ethnomusicologist. 
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It is through Jakkie, who from childhood was very close to Agaat, that the 
consequences of past deeds play out.
Eavesdropping on a conversation that Agaat is having with Jakkie on the 
telephone, Milla reflects:
My child the great absence.
What he inherited from me and Jak is certainly recognisable. Slightly 
melancholy, sometimes quite sharp with his tongue. Agaat one hears 
the clearest in him. The sayings, the songs, the rhymes, in which he 
has an obsessive interest. Sometimes she sings something on the phone 
for him if he can’t remember the words any more. (242/252–253; 
translation modified)25
Jakkie, as the novel often reminds us, has made an academic career out of his 
early life. He sees coming home as an opportunity to take notes on music 
and nationalism (675/701). But Milla’s observation that “Agaat one hears the 
clearest in him” registers something else. If the sharpness of his tongue comes 
from them, Jakkie has received his language, in its sound and its idiom, 
from Agaat. She “taught him to talk” (691/717). A transmission of cultural 
patrimony has taken place by a racially displaced relay. Transmission is always 
already a mixing. It is not simply that Jakkie has been taught his Afrikaans 
by someone who, because she is not white, is not an Afrikaner according 
to Afrikaner-nationalist ideology. When the events are analysed in terms of 
literary history and the phantasies that it reveals and sets to work, things are 
more involved than that. 
Viewed as part of an intellectual and literary history, the story of assimilation 
runs against the grain of dominant apartheid thinking. If the rage against 
“blood-mixing” of Geoffrey Cronjé, as analysed by J. M. Coetzee in “The 
Mind of Apartheid”, shows one effect of desire encoded into legislation 
(Giving Offense 178), assimilationist discourse, which represents a “liberal” 
strand of the same racial paternalism (as A. O. Neville surely must have in 
his Australia), shows another. The phantasmatic dimension of Agaat, which 
is in some sense the self-reflexive post-apartheid culmination of the tradition, 
prompts us to reread all of the “liberal” and left white Afrikaner discourse 
on assimilation: from N. P. van Wyk Louw’s famous “[d]ie bruinmense is óns 
mense, hóórt by ons” (the brown people are our people, belong with us) (1960) 
(623) to Breyten Breytenbach’s appeals over more than twenty-five years for 
Afrikaans to become “one of the many languages of Africa” (1973) (Season 
160) or for a “groot andersmaak” (1998) (Dog Heart 69), a great other-
making, in which the Afrikaner would become African. I read this discourse 
as relaying a wish that is at least double. In it the South African White, 
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“no longer European, not yet African”, in Coetzee’s formulation in White 
Writing (11), wishes to become African yet also wishes the African to become 
Afrikaner (or White). It is telling that Breytenbach’s term “andersmaak”, 
which is borrowed from a novel by Jan Rabie, alludes to an eighteenth-
century KhoiKhoi (Hottentot) leader’s decision to throw the lot of his people 
in with the Dutch frontier farmers. Assimilation, as servants, is viewed by 
him as the only means of survival.26
When Agaat’s casting out of the house is viewed as the story’s pivotal event, 
as it is once the cumulative force of its repeated representation in the novel 
has registered, we see how the reparative phantasy of making- and doing-
good that appears to have guided Milla in her adoption of Agaat turns 
into a persecutory phantasy of retribution through dispossession—the 
dispossession of her child, of the child that will never have been her child. 
Reparation and manic reparation alternate. The persecutory phantasy, in 
turn, allows the retrospective justification for Agaat’s initial dispossession by 
displacement from the house: Agaat is wicked, and will thus have deserved to 
be cast out. Alternately, the dispossession of Milla of her son also functions as 
part of a reparative phantasy that makes of Agaat a mother. This mother will, 
in a displacement, have been made into Jakkie’s mother by Jakkie’s mother. 
Jakkie himself recognises this maternal doubling when, after Milla’s funeral, 
he departs again for Canada: “Mourn my mother, my mothers, the white one 
and the brown one” (683/709). 
It is through a process of enculturative Bildung, which is also a mother-
making, that Agaat eventually becomes the inheritor or proprietor of the 
farm, Grootmoedersdrift. Michiel Heyns, who translated the novel with 
Van Niekerk’s collaboration (see De Kock), aids the reader by having Jakkie 
speculate further than in the Afrikaans—and perhaps further than Jakkie 
really comprehends—on how to translate the farm’s name: “Translate 
Grootmoedersdrift. Try it. Granny’s Ford? Granny’s Passion? What does that 
say?” (6/6).27 The word “drift”, or “drif ” in modern Afrikaans orthography—
of which “ford” is the obvious translation in the context of farm names, which 
are often topographical—can also mean “drive” in a psychological sense. It 
is cognate with the German Trieb. If the grand- or great-mother’s drive or 
passion is what gives the farm its name, then there is a complicated relay to 
the displacement of mother to mother, and mother by mother, which is also 
the path of inheritance by the female line. 
The making of this ambivalent mother—repaired and retributive, good and 
bad—is what the novel is about. It is about how the drive of the mother 
and her mother before her, in its complex workings, produces history. Race 
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and culture, and their mixings—these are elements for one kind of story 
when the desire of the father (or son) is moving them. Without trying to 
hear the unfathomed, and perhaps unfathomable, desire of the mother, 
and of the grandmother—Milla’s mother may, for motives of her own, 
have ambivalently wished the adoption of Agaat (655/679–680)—this will 
remain the only story. It will be the old story of miscegenation told in terms 
of male sexual desire—and, as its muted complement, of the repeated manic 
reparation of the mother by the errant father (son). The female counterpart 
in this story is, as Zoë Wicomb points out, the shamed mother, daughter, or 
wife. These are the standard dramatis personae in South African as well as 
Australian discourse. Even Neville’s “different story” of beginnings, in which 
the fathers accept responsibility, is a variant of the same tale. 
In South African literature, the plaasroman (farm novel), the genealogical 
genre par excellence in Afrikaans, has been critically reworked by Etienne van 
Heerden, J. M. Coetzee, and others.28 Continuing this project of rewriting, 
Van Niekerk is notable for staging the desire of the mother—in ways that 
make it less easily reducible to a mimetic relay of the desire of the father or 
father-son.
In order to follow the phantasmatic relay that distinguishes Agaat, it is 
necessary to understand how the novel plays with genre. Like Noyce’s 
adaptation of Pilkington, it reveals how desire and phantasy also animate 
non-fiction (racial polemic, memoir, among other forms) and film, both 
fictional and non-fictional. We will begin with the casting out of Agaat—
which is actually the repetition of an original casting-out. For it is that 
event, in its repetition, that gives meaning retrospectively and prospectively 
to Agaat’s enculturation and the subsequent mother-making in all its 
reparative-retributive ambivalence. Without making sense of this event in 
its repetition, and the desire evidently linked to it, we will not understand 
how Agaat will have come to be the source of Jakkie’s language, the racially 
different transmitter of his cultural heritage. Or if we understand how, we 
will not have understood why. That mixing in transmission, although it may 
be described in terms of an ideological contradiction of race and culture, 
cannot be explained as ideological contradiction.
When Agaat is adopted she is given a back room inside the farmhouse. 
When Milla is expecting Jakkie, Agaat is moved into a converted storeroom 
in the backyard, and her room is converted into a nursery for the boy. 
This displacement imposes a separation that conforms to the norms of the 
community and allegorises architecturally the delayed effects of apartheid 
on Coloured people (although she may have been born in 1947 [561/581], 
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Agaat is believed by Milla to have been born in 1948, and her adoption 
takes place in 1953, an election year in which the National Party intensified 
its efforts to remove Coloured voters from the electoral roll).29 When Milla 
records her decision and its consequences in her diary on 21 April 1960, the 
entry, the first that the reader of the novel encounters, couches the matter in 
moral and religious abstraction:
Off to a good start today with the fixing up of the rooms the outside 
room and the nursery. Understand for the first time why everything 
had to happen the way it did God’s great Providence [. . .] Now 
everything is as it should be suppose it’s the right thing to do for 
everyone’s sake. It’s not as if there was any other way out. Phoned 
Beatrice to tell her of my decision & she’s now considerably relieved 
& full of sweet talk & wants to propose me for chairlady of the WAU. 
Imagine! I could slap the woman, really. Situation with J. God be 
thanked better now that I’m doing something about the matter. That 
it should cost so much but I’d rather not think about it. (36/39)
Wishes or wishful thinking, what Milla writes in her journal establishes a 
pattern of imperatives noted down as facts. One must start well, make a 
“good start” (goeie begin). What one does must be “the right thing” (die regte 
ding). Even the “fixing up” of the two rooms—their regmaak—conveys this. 
Things must be right and good, good and right, so, in the journal, they are 
good and right. Even when, as the keeper of the diary acknowledges, the 
immediate consequences of her decision are a gain in the form of eased social 
and marital relations, the decision is drawn in transcendent terms (see also 
681/707–708). When Milla reflects that “[i]t’s not as if there was any other 
way out”, the Afrikaans expression, although it says more or less the same 
thing, shades her decision into the domain of mercy or grace: Daar was tog 
nie ander genade nie (literally: no other mercy, no other grace). It is consistent 
with her wish for God’s imprimatur to turn deed into duty: “everything had 
to happen the way it did God’s great Providence”. In spite of her wishes, and 
facts turned into imperatives, Milla perceives that what she has done will 
be entered or reentered into an economy. Her gain in social acceptance and 
domestic peace (see also 633/656) will mean also a loss. The high “cost” of 
her doing-good and doing-right to which she alludes will, must, also involve 
retribution—a paying back then and in the future that is going to exceed 
what Milla can bear to think about.
But it is important to see that the event is actually a repetition of an earlier 
set of events—which Milla did not write down in her diary: “The beginning 
you never recorded” (653/677). In Milla’s mind, Agaat is, in the years before 
Jakkie is born, the “[f ]irst child” (653/677). “Oh, my little Agaat”, Milla 
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sighs to herself on her deathbed, “my child that I pushed away from me, 
my child that I forsook after I’d made her my own” (540/560; translation 
modified). There is an enduring textual silence in Milla’s diaries as to the 
precise circumstances of Agaat’s adoption—which, among other things, 
means that, to the extent that her narration depends on citing what Milla 
has written, Agaat cannot narrate a crucial part of her story, although, 
throughout her life, she has symbolised it in a number of ways. If Agaat cannot 
properly have known Milla’s motivations and intentions, she cannot fully 
measure Milla’s culpability. The dynamics of reparation and retribution that 
involve the two women give rise to an aporia.30 Agaat’s symbolic repetition 
nevertheless magnifies the sense—for the reader at least—that in seeking to 
do good and do right Milla did the opposite, doing exactly what she sought 
to undo in the first place. 
In Van Niekerk, as in Noyce, genre plays an important part in generating 
meaning. In fairy tales the omnipotence of wishes is instrumental, and 
retributive punishment, which may stem from a wish, is frequent. This brings 
the genre into proximity with dynamics of reparation and manic reparation. 
Allusions in Agaat to the tale of Cinderella, as to fairy tales in general, are 
powerful and pervasive. When Milla first finds Agaat, she is “crouched in the 
corner of the blackened hearth with the knuckles of one hand crammed into 
her mouth” (656/680). Which, of course, is also where Cinderella is found, 
and from where she takes her name. Here is the version from the brothers 
Grimm: “In the evening, when she had worked herself to exhaustion, she did 
not get into bed but had to lay herself down in the ash beside the hearth. 
And because this made her always look dusty and dirty, they called her 
Aschenputtel” (Grimm 116). When Milla asks the little girl her name, this 
is what happens:
Then you heard it, from the cavern of the child’s body where she’d 
stowed her head, a guttural sound.
Say again, I couldn’t hear so well, say?
You went still closer . . . 
Again all you could make out was a scraping sound.
Ggggg-what? you asked, that’s not a name, say it again for the kleinnooi 
so that I can hear nicely, come. Gogga? Grieta? Gesiena? Genys?
You turned you head with your ear against the child’s face and imitated 
the ggggg-sound. You could feel her breath on your face. Thís time 
you heard the ggggg clearly, like a sigh it sounded, like a rill in the 
fynbos, very soft, and distant, like the sound you hear before you’ve 
even realised what you’re hearing.
That was the beginning. That sound. (657/681–682)
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Milla is told by the little girl’s older sister that “[s]he doesn’t really have a 
name, we call her Gat, Asgat, because she sits with her arse in the ash in the 
fireplace all the time. She won’t wear a panty” (666/691). Whereas “Asgat” 
(“Ash-arse”, with gat literally meaning “hole”) brings the fairytale down to 
earth, in Afrikaans, the proper name for Cinderella (which never actually 
appears in Agaat) is close to the German Aschenputtel: Aspoestertjie. As in the 
German, the diminutive personifies the labour of a domestic menial: putteln 
in German and poets in Afrikaans mean to dust or polish. If the poester is 
a transposition of letters in poetser, in the word we also hear poes, vulgar 
Afrikaans for vagina. Encrypted in the little girl’s name in Afrikaans, then, 
is the other gat, the one that marks her as female, and as a potential mother, 
the one that “Asgat” only slightly displaces. Where she sits and the name she 
gets materialise a rejection by her mother and father, who are repelled by her 
congenitally malformed arm: “Ma [. . .] [d]idn’t want to give the child tit 
[. . .] Pa Joppies said give here, let me go and get rid of that, it’s not my 
child” (664/689). By the time that Milla finds her, she has also been raped 
and abused, which has evidently rendered her incapable of having children 
of her own (166/174). Milla makes it her business to turn the name of 
rejection and abjection into something good. The adoption takes place on, 
of all days in the Afrikaner-nationalist calendar, the Day of the Covenant, 16 
December (654/679), the holiday commemorating the Voortrekkers’ vow to 
God in 1838 made in return for victory over the Zulus, and thus, for later 
ideology, a key moment in the divinely ordained civilising mission of the 
volk. Hence, after trying out other names (470/486, 481/497), with the help 
of the Mission Church dominee she chooses the name Agaat:
“Agaat” he suggested then. Odd name, don’t know it at all, but then he 
explained, it’s Dutch for Agatha, it’s close to the sound of Asgat with 
the guttural “g”, it’s a semi-precious stone, I say, quite, he says, you 
only see the value of it if it’s correctly polished, but that’s not all, look 
with me in the book here, it’s from the Greek “agathos” which means 
“good”. And if your name is good, he says, it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Like a holy brand it will be, like an immanent destiny, the name on the 
brow, to do good, to want to be good, goodness itself. (487/504)
Within a religious framework (in which, if The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
is accurate, the believed omnipotence of wishes operates in displaced form), 
the name may be understood to work in its immanence. The text of the diary 
entry is, however, telegraphic enough to register an ambiguity when it records 
what the dominee said. The interpretation of the name as a brand “to do good, 
to want to be good, goodness itself ” begins to be detached from the dominee 
as interpreter, and from any person at all. It could therefore be the immanent 
destiny of Milla to do good, to want to be good, to make Agaat good, into 
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goodness itself. Agaat will absorb and inherit this imperfectly acknowledged 
wish or desire. This is also the exhortation that Aschenputtel’s dying mother 
bequeathes her: “liebes Kind, bleib fromm und gut” (beloved child, be pious 
and good) (Grimm 116). In becoming Agaat, Asgat is to become precious 
or noble (edel), or at least semi-precious or semi-noble (halfedel), yet still 
valuable, through the polishing of her adoptive mother who herself wishes to 
do and be good. As halfedel implies, the spoils of goodness are divided from 
the start; Agaat will have to share in a nobility secretly desired by Milla. But, 
like the “gat” in “Asgat”, the hole that is not only anus but gap, an absence, 
a zero, the “ggggg-sound” preserved by her with the help of the dominee is, 
as Milla registers (657/682), a sonic remainder at and from the beginning 
that is not reducible to a name. Even the name of the farm, Goedbegin, with 
its double guttural, suggests that the beneficent or benign beginning bears 
within it the trace of something equivocal and not reducible to that name if 
it names a wish for doing or being good. That sound is something that the 
name will not reduce or erase. It is the spacing of the hearing-something that 
comes before the hearing-what. The remainder will be a reminder.
The irony that the farm from which Agaat comes is called Goedbegin, and 
that the “goeie begin” Milla writes of in her 1960 diary when renovating 
the yard room is neither good nor properly the beginning, is one way in 
which the novel tells us that the dynamics of making “Agaat” (as Good) and 
of making-good are complicated and equivocal. “What exactly is it that’s 
driving me?” Milla asks herself on 6 January 1954, a few weeks after she 
adopts Agaat (482/498). What is the relevant drive? This never ceases to be 
the question. As Milla’s disease advances, and she is no longer able to speak, 
Agaat devises a system of communication whereby Milla may gesture to 
letters and commonly used words stuck on a board and in so doing form full 
sentences. These sentences Agaat spells out and repeats for Milla aloud: “I was 
alone, I felt useless, I wanted to do something for my fellow humans” (437/452). 
The writing-down system allows repressed alternatives to surface simply by 
making it possible to substitute words for those that Milla is likely to have 
intended to say (but which Agaat, strictly speaking, cannot know for certain 
to have been applicable). When the substituted words are prepositions, other, 
perhaps equally plausible logics surface. If there is anywhere in the novel that 
Agaat emerges as a focaliser, it is here, with her mimetic citation of Milla’s 
words:31
She can’t always keep her voice neutral. She charges my sentences with 
her own resonances. Disbelief, emphasis, mockery. She adds on and 
improvises. To my own ears I sound like a running commentary rather 
than original intention.
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Do something for your fellow humans? Or do something wíth your fellow 
humans or tó your fellow humans? Féllow human or súb- or súperhuman? 
Or half human? Less human than yourself? 
Sometimes when we’ve completed a sentence, she doesn’t repeat it at 
all, so that I lose my thread amongst stray words. (437–438/452–453; 
translation modified)
When the prepositions shift from dative to accusative, making the recipient 
a direct object of the deed, the effects may be equivocal. This may be the 
only way that the novel actually allows Agaat to narrate. Milla realises that “I 
can’t tell her story on her behalf ” (439/454). But when the novel has Jakkie 
remember “Gaat’s story” (683/710)—the chilling bedtime fairy story of how 
he became hers that ends the novel—the account of Milla’s motives it gives 
also involves Milla’s mother’s desire—or, shall we say, Agaat’s grootmoeder’s 
drive, a drive that remains as opaque as it is determining: “And when twelve 
o’clock struck, her mother said to her: Go and see there in the labourers’ cottages, 
there’s a girl who’s been cast off, perhaps you can help her” (684/711). The 
memory of her mother’s off-stage role also comes back to Milla from time 
to time. But here the grandmother is brought on stage and given a speaking 
part, the untranslatable words of racial differentiation and superiority that 
she might have uttered cast back at her by being cast at her grandson: “Gaan 
kyk daar by die volk se huisies [. . .]”.
Whatever the drive was, as in the history of Australian state paternalism, it 
does not prevent the initial casting out from being repeated. “Óut she said 
to Good. Óut of my house, from now on you live in a little room outside in the 
backyard” (689/715), is how it appears in Agaat’s story as Jakkie remembers 
it. Agaat, who appears to be the only one who perceives—because she 
experiences—the casting out as a repetition of wrong, symbolises it when she 
goes on strike, burning food, in the summer heat of October 1961 to demand 
a fireplace for her room. There is, associated with this symbolic repetition, 
an element of making-good: “Whát must I do to get you good? I want a 
fireplace, she says. I ask you!” (265/276). One day Milla spies on her, and sees 
her withdraw into the firegrate: “You take the poker, you pull out the grate. 
You crawl into your hearth, white cap first. You go and lie with your knees 
pulled up in the old black soot” (249/259). Agaat’s burial of the colourful 
dresses that she wore as a child, her irrevocable assumption of the black and 
white raiment of a servant, also allude to Cinderella (see Grimm 116). Milla, 
however, does not appear to comprehend the symbolism. And Jakkie, who is 
told as a boy that the letter slot in the door of his room through which Milla 
spied on Agaat dates from when the sick were quarantined, never grasps the 
irony of the notion of the child’s “being chosen” in Milla’s dedication to Agaat 
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of her diary, which Agaat leaves open for Jakkie to find (681/707). And, 
although he can remember it word for word, it remains an open question as 
to whether he genuinely grasps “Gaat’s story” in its application.
The “opportunities” and “privileges” and “great task of education” (681/707) to 
which the dedication also alludes materialise in the form of an acculturation or 
enculturation. Central to Agaat’s curriculum are the three books from which 
the novel draws its epigraphs: the FAK-Volksangbundel, the standard musical 
anthology of Afrikaans songs; Borduur só, a women’s guide to embroidery; 
and Hulpboek vir boere in Suid-Afrika, a manual for farmers. These are also 
the books that, along with the Bible and Kook en geniet, a popular Afrikaans 
cookbook, appear on the list of necessaries that Milla compiles for Agaat 
when she is expelled from the house into the room in the yard (52/55). Just 
before comes the list for Jakkie, and what will be needed for his nursery. The 
making of a white child is mirrored by the making of a Coloured servant. 
There is indeed the transmission of a cultural legacy, as Agaat is given an 
old copy of the Hulpboek vir boere that belonged to Milla’s father. But this 
legation takes place across the backyard, across an abyss of racial separation 
represented typographically by the discrete lists.32
Agaat’s destiny is, as the novel keeps reminding us, to become more Afrikaans 
than her mistress and master. “She’s made great strides with the embroidery, 
Agaat”, Milla observes from her deathbed, “she’d by now be able to add a few 
chapters to the embroidery book” (78/82). When Agaat passes the test set as 
punishment of correctly calculating the settings for the wheat-seeder’s gears, 
Milla notes in her diary, “There’s not a single farmer of my acquaintance 
who could do that sum. How can I do it to her?” (227/236). And at Milla’s 
funeral, Jakkie recalls, in a cliché of how to expose the hypocrisy of Afrikaner 
nationalists who never sing their entire national anthem, “Gaat making people 
by the graveside sing the third verse of Die Stem [. . .] Trust Agaat. She would 
have no truck with the new anthem” (675/701). How to read this destiny? 
The path of adoption, acculturation, inheritance by the female line—the 
making-good that is the making of “Agaat”—can be read as a phantasy of the 
making of a super-Afrikaner: the Afrikaner who is more than the Afrikaner, 
but also the Afrikaner who survives the demise of the Afrikaner. 
As Johann Rossouw acutely observes, even when Agaat proves to be a “better 
Afrikaner than the Afrikaners of Afrikaner nationalism”, the possibility “that 
there was or might still be an Afrikaner other than that of nationalism is 
never contemplated in Agaat” (4, 6). With its assembling of doing good 
and right and surviving, Agaat is, perhaps, a manic (or manic-depressive) 
retextualising of N. P. van Wyk Louw’s voortbestaan in geregtigheid (existing-
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forth or survival in justice).33 The verbal capaciousness of the novel itself, its 
encyclopedic grasp and extravagant performance of the Afrikaans language 
right down to its specialised vocabularies of farming and embroidery and 
botany, and its idioms and songs, is itself an (untranslatable) gesture toward 
survival in disappearance. It is this performative survival that Rossouw 
underplays when he associates Agaat with a tendency to “selfopheffing” 
(self-abolition) he detects in contemporary Afrikaans discourse—when he 
might have exploited the play of abolition and lifting up in “opheffing” 
as in Aufhebung in Hegel’s German, to which his term surely alludes.34 In 
terms of this phantasy of surviving through passing away it is, I believe, 
impossible to decide whether, through Milla’s education of Agaat, the 
African becomes (super-)Afrikaner, or, through Agaat’s part in the formation 
of Jakkie, the Afrikaner becomes African (although, of course, he leaves for 
the Americas, for life as an insufferably glib scholar of his homeland—as of 
the “polyphonic wailings of Australian aboriginal women” [15/17]). Both of 
these eventualities, though, must be in play if either is to be possible. The 
path leads by and by to a miscegenation by the maternal line that is always 
disavowed, always apprehended under the sign of something else. In Agaat, 
it is apprehended under the sign of retribution—sometimes as a scene for the 
jealous eye of Milla, in other instances putatively in the imagination of Agaat 
herself.35 Racial and cultural, this maternal miscegenation is, as Van Niekerk 
stages it, driven at every step by phantasy.
Retribution occurs in the novel in different ways. Perhaps the most 
interesting is how the hearth that symbolises Agaat’s repeated casting out 
changes in its symbolism. Initially a sign of exile, it becomes the centre, if 
not of the household, then of Jakkie’s world. A year before the fireplace is 
built in Agaat’s room, Milla, who suspects that Agaat may be breastfeeding 
the infant Jakkie, spies on them: “& I look & I see & I can’t believe what I 
see perhaps I dreamed it the apron’s shoulder band is off & the sleeve of the 
dress hangs empty & her head is bent to the child on her lap [. . .] I stand 
in the drizzle [. . .] with my forehead pressed against the window sill & I 
listen to the little sounds it sucks & sighs it’s a whole language out there in 
the outside room I can almost not bring myself to write it” (206/215). Milla 
unwittingly bears the white smudge of the lime from the windowsill as a sign 
of jealousy on her forehead (see also 299/310, 313/325). She can still write 
in her diary, apparently without irony, that “the servant’s quarters is not a 
place for my child” (206/215; my emphasis). At Agaat’s breast, and before 
her hearth, is where Jakkie is raised, and learns how to speak. For Milla, 
Agaat, who also helped deliver him, has become Jakkie’s mother (295/306). 
It is the way that, after being cast out, Agaat has become good again. Jakkie 
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has become the price that Milla has had to pay: “You used the child,” she 
reflects, “Only through hím would she become good again” (289/301). And 
the last words of the fairy story of “Good” that Agaat tells Jakkie countersign 
this construction: “And her bile subsided because he was the light of her life” 
(691/717). In the story that she tells, Good’s wrath toward the woman 
who cast her out has been appeased by Good’s retributive appropriation of 
the woman’s child, whom she “gave [. . .] a name that only she knew about. 
You-are-mine she called him” (690/717). Thus, any reading emphasising the 
redeeming goodness of Agaat (for instance, as Milla’s nurse and companion 
to the end) without attending to her retribution may unwittingly participate 
in the manic-reparative phantasy of making Agaat good by which Milla seeks 
to dispel fear of retribution—generalisable to the post-apartheid transition 
in South Africa, in Robert Meister’s brilliant analysis of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, as the psychic appeasement by the perpetrator 
or beneficiary of fears of the “unreconciled victim”.36
Whose phantasy is it? Jakkie’s? Milla’s? Agaat is a figure of phantasy—and 
of Jakkie’s flippant English-language mental captions (“Apartheid Cyborg” 
is the one that damns him most [677/703]). Such questions are, of course, 
unanswerable. When fiction is singular and unverifiable, there is no way of 
finally attributing it. Yet the final words of Agaat’s story, as remembered by 
Jakkie, appear to declare the complicity of the implied author of Agaat in a 
phantasy of good-making that the novel as a whole interrogates. A comment 
on the narration of events in the genre of fairy tale, they and the entire 
story that Jakkie recalls as “Grimm meets Goth in the Overberg” (692/718) 
are metafictional. In this regard, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s comments 
on Mahasweta Devi’s “Breast-Giver”, another story of mothering, remain 
instructive: “The end of the story undoes [the] careful distancing of the 
author from the gender-ideological interpellation of the protagonist [. . .] 
It [. . .] call[s] into question the strategically well-advertised ironic stance of 
the author-function” (In Other Worlds 266). If in Devi’s story, for Spivak, 
this closing of distance represents a lapse in the implied author’s critical 
stance in relation to the voice-consciousness of her subaltern character, in 
Van Niekerk’s novel, the “truth” of the entire work is brought into question 
by “Gaat’s story”. The very fact that the voice of the subaltern countersigns 
the phantasies of Milla must place in doubt the idea that the “truth” of the 
events in the novel is to be derived any more from the “analysis” of Milla’s 
acts as driven by phantasies of reparation than from the structure of fairy 
tale—in which things good and bad take place because a character wishes 
them. 
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The great strength of Agaat is that it is does not profess to be a work of 
fictional realism through and through.37 By elevating the explanatory power 
of fairy tale, Van Niekerk questions the explanatory power of the work as a 
whole—and perhaps of narrative fiction (and non-fiction) in general. If it 
shows how phantasy can make history, Agaat also suggests that the idea that 
phantasy makes history, to the extent that it implies that the motives of the 
protagonists are fully present to themselves, may itself be a phantasy—if, for 
example, as in a fairy story, the idea of history as the operation of phantasy 
produces the narrative and ideological closure implied by the final sentence 
of “Gaat’s story”. 
Comparing works in South African and Australian literature and film, I 
have explored the extent to which the concepts of race and culture that 
justify theories and policies of social engineering, and in turn motivate their 
reform and retrospective condemnation, may be underwritten both by overt 
ideological commitments and by powerful unspoken paranoid and reparative 
phantasies. My analysis of Agaat over against the Australian works shows how 
that very diagnosis—Phantasy!—may reproduce or elaborate the phantasy in 
question, or at least a part of it. If genre fiction and film—melodrama, fairy 
tale, and so forth—bring phantasy on stage, the metafictional manipulation 
of genre affords ways of demonstrating how that rendering visible may itself 
be complicit in an unacknowledged phantasy of mastery. The debate for 
critics such as Jennifer Rutherford appears to be: does that complicity so 
compromise political and cultural analysis, that it reproduces exactly what it 
analyses and is thus not worth pursuing at all? The answer must be that, yes, 
sometimes it does. The trouble is that one cannot know, or begin to find, 
an answer to that question until one has “experienced”—in Derrida’s special 
sense of traversing or experiencing an aporia, experiencing the impossible 
(“Force of Law” 963)—the effects of having engaged in the analysis in 
question.
NOTES
 1 This essay was fi rst presented as the keynote address at the annual Association 
for the Study of Australian Literature (ASAL) conference “The Colonial Present: 
Australian Writing for the 21st Century”, held at the University of Queensland in 
Brisbane from 1–4 July 2007, and subsequently at the Association of University 
English Teachers of South Africa (AUETSA) annual meeting, “Worlds, Texts, 
Critics”, which took place at the University of Kwazulu-Natal in Durban from 
8–11 July 2007.
 2 See Bringing Them Home (29–33), as well as Haebich, Broken Circles (454–
455).
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 3 The histories are not cross-referenced as much as one might expect. In Australian 
sources see, however, Neville (202) and Haebich, For Their Own Good (141). 
 4 A penetrating critical account of the report is provided by Frow. For an 
interesting comparison of the Australian Inquiry to South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, see Whitlock.
 5 In this regard I thank Rosanne Kennedy, Catriona Elder, Kay Schaffer, and 
Gillian Whitlock for their comments on an earlier version of this section of my 
essay, presented at the conference “Testimony and Witness: From the Local to 
the Transnational”, held at the Australian National University in Canberra in 
February 2006.
 6 Pilkington’s text quotes the report of A. J. Keeling, writing of Molly, Gracie 
and Daisy, the protagonists of the book, that “these children lean more towards 
the black than white” (Pilkington 61). Although race was an unstable index of 
differentiation, in the context of removal being designated as black or white 
could depend on whether an offi cial thought that a given child looked white 
or black, or did not. Thus, as Pilkington records, although lighter-skinned 
children were sometimes persecuted in Aboriginal communities, attempts were 
sometimes made by Aborigines to make the skins of half-caste children look 
darker not only to relieve this persecution but also in order to help them evade 
their removal (38–42). This is also described by Neville (46).
 7 See Pilkington (47–49, 129.)
 8 See Frow, “Politics of Stolen Time” (358) for more commentary on this 
question, in Bringing Them Home. See also Probyn (67).
 9 On the limited budget of Neville’s offi ce, see Haebich, For Their Own Good 
(258–259).
 10 For a useful commentary on the fi lm, in particular its portrayal of Neville, see 
Birch.
 11 See Pilkington (41, 61, 102, 124–129).
 12 See Coetzee, Giving Offense (163–184), as well as Sanders, “Undesirable 
Publications”.
 13 The historical Neville was married to Maryon Florence (“Gypsy”) Sutherland 
Low for more than fi fty years. They had four children, one of whom died in 
infancy. For details of Neville’s biography, see Jacobs.
 14 See Spivak, Death of a Discipline (14); Alford (38–40).
 15 See Klein, “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States” (350–352). 
Also see Segal (95–96). My discussion of manic reparation is indebted to Robert 
Meister’s “Ways of Winning”.
 16 See Haebich, Broken Circles (425, 437).
 17 The applicability of the term “genocide” to the “stolen generations”, and to 
Australian colonial history more broadly, is a contested one. For an astute 
discussion of the debate on the subject, see Levi (especially 140–149).
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 18 The events of late June and early July 2007 added another episode to the 
exploits of this particular “white father”—who, having sent the army and 
police into the Northern Territory in response to allegations that children were 
being abused in Aboriginal communities, proclaimed: “We are not trying to 
steal a generation. We are trying to save a generation” (quoted in “We Have 
Crossed”). During this time the qualifi ed support for Howard’s intervention 
from Noel Pearson was notable, and interesting in its formulation in the name 
of a good that may be complicit with the bad: “We have to deal with the 
Government and the politics of the day and devote our maximum energies 
and talents towards making good things that otherwise seem bad” (Pearson, 
“Action Only Way”). Elsewhere Pearson has cannily written of his conviction 
“that the distance between good and bad policies is most often very fi ne—not 
poles apart” (“White Guilt” 45). For a useful commentary on Pearson’s position 
in historical context, see Manne.
 19 This point is well made by Newman, who presents an interesting comparison 
of Benang and J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (Chapter 5).
 20 See Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing” and “Le facteur de la vérité”.
 21 This is readily apparent in My Place, in which Sally Morgan’s work of genealogical 
exploration is stymied by the secrecy of her maternal grandmother—regarding, 
for instance, the identity and fate of her other daughter. And because of the 
grandmother’s reticence, even the identity of Morgan’s mother’s father remains 
veiled by suggestion and supposition. Stephen Muecke provocatively suggests 
that Morgan’s grandmother’s silence in the face of her questions may be 
interpreted over against a longer history of resistance of Indigenous Australians 
to the inquiries of white investigators: “a possible Aboriginal discursive strategy 
which would take the form of non-disclosure in the face of the demand to speak” 
(128).
 22 I allude to Coetzee’s use of René Girard in Giving Offense. Also see Coetzee’s 
reading of Rooke (Stranger Shores 208–218).
 23 Van Niekerk is also the author of the novel Triomf (1994), the novella with 
paintings by Adriaan van Zyl Memorandum: ’n verhaal met skilderye (2006), 
a collection of stories Die vrou wat haar verkyker vergeet het (1992), and the 
collections of poetry Sprokkelster (1977) and Groenstaar (1983).
 24 Michiel Heyns emphasises this by introducing fi ve lines from T. S. Eliot’s “Little 
Gidding” as an epigraph to his 2006 English translation of Agaat.
 25 Parenthetical page references to the original Afrikaans edition follow those to 
the English translation. Any modifi cations by me of Heyns’s translation are 
indicated in the text.
 26 For more on Breytenbach and Rabie, see Sanders, Complicities (145–146). 
 27 The Afrikaans reads: “Vertaal Grootmoedersdrift. Probeer dit. Granny’s Ford? 
Wat sê dit?”
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 28 In the initial reception of the novel, nearly every reviewer and critic has 
commented on Van Niekerk’s adaptation of the plaasroman (see, for example, 
Van der Merwe, Rossouw). The novel itself signals its critical affi liation, for 
instance in the titles of books in Milla’s personal library (14/16).
 29 For a detailed catalogue of the novel’s symbolic dates, see Rossouw.
 30 On the aporia of reparation, see Sanders, Ambiguities of Witnessing (114–146).
 31 There is also Agaat’s “mimesis” of Milla’s diaries through reading and recitation—
her parody, for example, of words abbreviated by Milla by pronouncing them 
without their vowels—“undrprvlgd” (79/83) is the most hurtful—or her 
making of Milla’s telegraphic sentences into full, correctly punctuated ones.
 32 Agaat’s early learning, which is not always reducible to Afrikaner(-nationalist) 
enculturation, is another reminder and remainder, when conveyed to Jakkie, 
of a promise always already broken (see, for instance, 295/307).
 33 For more on this subject, see Sanders, Complicities (72–92).
 34 Rossouw’s association of Van Niekerk with “selfopheffi ng” is challenged by 
Visagie.
 35 The casting out does emerge as the crux for Milla (215/224, also 540/560).
 36 “Justice-as-reconciliation replaces the unreconciled victim of revolutionary 
theory with the victim who was morally undamaged by past oppression[. . .] . 
This splitting of the victim of systemic injustice into an object to be loved and 
an object to be feared is a way of ensuring that guilt and loss are not directly 
experienced by the benefi ciaries of past evil, because they never recognise the 
objects of that guilt as having been damaged by themselves [. . .] [‘Justice-
as-reconciliation’] is [. . .] a form of what some psychoanalysts call ‘mock’ or 
‘manic’ reparation, which is also based on a splitting-off of truth and justice” 
(Meister 85–98).
 37 Van der Merwe, who takes Jakkie to be the “creator of the story” as a whole, 
but also fi nds an intertwining of points of view, comments: “What the novel 
wants to represent is not ‘reality,’ but refl ection on refl ection on refl ection of 
reality—or, put in another way, the ‘reality’ of relationships” (4–5). 
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